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PANDORA'SBEoX
Biotechnology is beginning to trans- A
form agriculture across the globe. After
thousands of years of traditional plant
and animal breeding, and centuries of
mechanization and chemical application, genetic research has opened a
Pandora's box of living modified
organisms (LMOs) designed to
improve the productivity and efficiency of commercial agriculture.
A multitude of transgenic crops
and animals is now being
introduced into commerce by
biotechnology companies, and b
nations are puzzling out how
to appropriate the benefits and
manage the risks.
American biotechnology companies and agencies are the leading proponents of using LMOs. They claim that two
decades of costly and careful research and
several years of field testing in the United
States prove that the LMOs being offered
are a safe and effective means of improving
productivity, reducing dependency on toxic
chemicals, preventing environmental and
health hazards, enhancing nutrition, achieving a reliable food supply for burgeoning
populations in poorer countries, and promoting sustainable growth.
In their new book, Agricultural
Biotechnology and the Environment, professors Sheldon Krimsky and Roger Wrubel of
Tufts University assess the emerging universe of LMOs and divide it into several
broad categories induding:
* herbicide-resistant crops (such as new
strains of corn, soybeans, and potatoes) in
which new genes are introduced to diminish plant sensitivity to chemical herbicides, or to detoxify the herbicides;
* insect-resistant crops (such as new strains
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Colorado potato beetle, and which may
soon include virulent strains of bac-

uloviruses;

of com, soybeans, and pQM3Me) in which
the introduced genes, most commonly
pf
from Bacillus thurinvini (Bt)
ic insect pests that ingest the Bt without
causing toxic or other harmful effects on
nontarget species;
* disease-resistant crops (such as alfalfa,
squash, corn, and potatoes) in which the
new genes provide antifungal properties
and other defenses against plant

pathogens;
* product-producing crops in which the
new genes enable plants to produce more
nutritious or attractive foods (Calgene's
Flavr Savr tomato), serums and vaccines
(W.R. Grace's modified potato and
tobacco plants), and oils for industrial use
(new strains of rapeseed);
* biopesticides, which thus far involve
release-modified forms of Bt in field
applications to kill targeted pest species
such as the European corn borer and the

_ productivity-enhancing bacteria
such as nitrogen-fixing bacteria (to
improve soil fertility) and frost-inhibiting bacteria;
o animal growth hormones to produce
leaner meat for health-conscious consumers, or more productive animals (for
example, using bovine somatotropin to
increase milk production); and
*transgenic animals, created by introducing foreign DNA into fertilized eggs, to
provide leaner meat, carry human disease
for health research, or function as bioreactors in "pharming" for therapeutic products (such as Genzyme Transgenics' goat
capable of producing BR-96, an experimental anticancer drug).
To develop such LMOs and introduce
them into commerce, American companies
must cormply with a detailed framework of
federal biosafety requirements that use risk
assessment and risk management methods.
The biosafety requirements range from containment of certain LMOs for research in
secure laboratories to subsequent procedures
for the assessment, approval, and monitoring of field releases. Since most LMOs
intended for agricultural use ultimately
require their release into the environment
outside the lab, field test requirements are
the most critical feature of the biosafety
review process. Depending on the type of
biotechnological product involved, regulatory authority of the United States Department of Agriculture, the Environmental
Protection Agency, or the Food and Drug
Administration applies to and governs company testing and introduction of agricultural
LMOs into commerce.

Volume 104, Number 7, July 1996 * Environmental Health Perspectives

Spheres of Influence * LMOs
In the past five years, over 2,000 field
tests of LMOs at over 8,000 carefully selected sites in the United States have been
approved and conducted without a single
reported adverse or even unpleasant impact
on the environment or public health,
according to officials at the USDA. This far
surpasses the total experience of all other
nations, according to biotech industry and
agency officials, and should provide considerable assurance to other nations that
LMOs offered by American firms can be
safely managed.

Concerns About LMOs
Genetically modified organisms that are not
intended for agriculture but are used for
research or development purposes, such as
transgenic mice or bacteria, are subject to
"contained use" requirements in the United
States and the European Union countries.
Such requirements are intended to prevent
accidental release of LMOs, which could
present an immediate or delayed hazard to
health or the environment, and are riskbased and somewhat variable. Some containment measures used include physical and
chemical barriers, engineering controls, negative air pressure, spill containment equipment, and treatment of wastes prior to offsite disposal. These measures are reinforced
by requirements for employee training, protective equipment and decontamination
facilities, emergency plans and practice
codes, record-keeping and reporting, and
biosafety oversight and accountability. By far
the larger controversy deals with genetically
modified organisms and agriculture.
Despite experience and claims about
LMO benefits and safety, American companies and policymakers face dogged opposition as they promote the introduction of
LMOs into commercial agriculture at home
and abroad. Opponents challenge the scientific adequacy of American field testing for
biosafety and company claims that LMOs
ensure greater productivity. Many also contend that commercial use of LMOs will
cause environmental and socioeconomic
disruptions and undermine the self-reliance
of developing nations.
For example, Jane Rissler and Margaret
Mellon of the Union of Concerned
Scientists, in their recent book, The
Ecological Risks ofEngineered Crops, raise
questions about environmental risks.
Although finding that "most genetically
engineered organisms will not be harmful,"
they oppose unregulated commercial use on
the grounds that American field testing for
biosafety has been short-term and smallscale, and is even waived as a requirement
for certain transgenic plants. Although the
small field test sites have been carefully

selected and monitored to minimize transgenic interbreeding with wild plant relatives
and other undesirable consequences, these
precautionary measures are not likely to be
followed in developing nations at much
larger commercial sites covering millions of
acres. In addition, they say, the American
test sites do not match likely commercial
sites abroad in terms of ecological conditions, biodiversity, plant relatives with interbreeding potential, and natural events such
as floods which can transport seeds to more
vulnerable off-site regions.
Thus, Rissler and Mellon contend that
American field testing offers little, if any,
assurance of biosafety to other nations and,
drawing on ecological principles, point to
several risk scenarios:
* gene flow, in which new genes for insect,
disease, or herbicide resistance flow to wild
plant relatives and weeds, causing agricultural and ecological havoc unless effective
controls are available and affordable;
* harms to nontarget species arising, for
example, from new gene products with
toxic qualities being ingested by birds and
other feeders in the regions where such
LMOs are cultivated;
* cascading effects on an ecosystem triggered by the introduction of LMOs, such
as pests developing resistance over time to
Bt in transgenic plants, or being deflected
to other food sources; and
* loss of biological diversity, arising from
LMO displacement of other species, with
particular regard for those developing
nations that possess great concentrations
of crop diversity but lack infrastructure
and expertise for preventing the loss.
Biotechnology companies and agencies
draw on biosafety experience to dispute
such contentions and argue that any residual risks are manageable. Conflicts over certain LMOs have also become quite intense,
with both sides using various tactics to win
over public perception and trigger market
forces.
The newest conflict involves evidence of
gene flow from an herbicide-resistant rapeseed that was engineered by Germany's
AgroEvo GmbH for enhanced production
of canola oil. According to a report by
Danish researcher Thomas Mikkelsen and
colleagues at the Riso National Laboratory
in Roskilde, published in the 7 March 1996
issue of Nature, the herbicide-resistant genes
quickly flowed to a wild plant relative
through cross-breeding, and produced fertile offspring that are now herbicide-resistant as well. According to environmental
and consumer groups, this study demonstrates that LMOs pose gene flow risks
when plant relatives are nearby, that current
agency oversight for biosafety is scientifically
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and legally inadequate to prevent such
occurrences, and that the biotechnology
mantra that "hybrids don't survive, so don't
worry is wrong.
However, Richard Godown of the
Biotechnology Industry Association (BIO),
which includes over 500 companies, government centers, and academic institutions
in over 20 countries, describes the Danish
study as "a propagation deliberately done in
the laboratory which was then theoretically
extrapolated to natural conditions," and
believes that such gene flows in nature can
be prevented by careful site selection for
commercial agriculture, buffer zones, and
other risk management methods.
Val Geddings, international team leader
for the USDA's Animal and Plant Health
Inspector Service, adds that the gene flow
finding has been improperly described as an
"unpleasant surprise," when in fact, it was
well-known beforehand that rapeseed genes
flow to certain weedy relatives without serious environmental consequences, whether
the plant was traditionally bred or recombinant, as is the case with broccoli and cauliflower genes. Nor was it an adverse outcome
according to Geddings, because the gene
flow from the recombinant plant posed no
greater environmental risk than the gene
flow from its traditionally bred counterpart.
As for the consequence of herbicide-resistant weeds, "one answer is to switch to
another herbicide," he said.
In addition to environmental opposition, commercial use of LMOs is also resisted on grounds that it will cause major
socioeconomic dislocations, particularly in
developing nations where the initial impact
would involve displacement of small family
farms by more efficient, high-tech corporate
agriculture. Some say a subsequent domino
effect could include the erosion of traditional village culture, unemployment for the
unskilled, and growing dependence on foreign interests and experts for food supply.
Concurrently, native populations and their
environments would become the subjects of
further research to fine-tune the safer or
more productive use of LMOs without adequate safeguards. Eventually, opponents
worry that multinational firms from the
United States or other developed nations
could capture other local enterprises in the
food production system, such as seed sup-

pliers, shippers, distributors, brokers,
processors, and retailers through acquisition,
joint venture, or various forms of strategic
alliance.
Although these concems may seem to be
merely another variation on the familiar tension between developed and developing
nations, there is evidence in various regions
of the United States that at least some of
705
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these socioeconomic impacts can and do flow
from corporate entry into local agriculture.
Environmental and consumer organizations in developed nations share these
socioeconomic concerns, and many developing nations share their ecological concerns
regarding biodiversity protection. An international coalition formed by non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace,
certain Scandinavian countries, and the G77 nations (an informal coalition of developing countries that plays a major role in many
U.N. decisions and policy processes), has
called for the United Nations to establish
means of assuring biosafety for the protection of biodiversity, as well as improve the
capabilities of developing nations for managing the biotechnological transformation of
agriculture so that it is consistent with their
agricultural, socioeconomic, and environmental goals and sustainable development.
Authority for U.N. enactment of such a
legally-binding framework is provided by the
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.
Convention on Biological Diversity
Biological diversity was raised at the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment
held in Stockholm in 1972 and prioritized
by the newly formed United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) in 1973.
In 1988, a joint resolution of the U.S.
Congress signed by President Reagan lent
support to U.S. initiatives for an international agreement, and UNEP convened the
first of several expert groups to evaluate the
need for (and later, to draft) an international legal instrument, or convention, for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
In June 1992, the convention was
"opened for signature" at the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, despite displeasure by the United States and France
over irregularities in the hasty negotiation
process, and legal ambiguities and substantive deficiencies in the final text. By June
1993, 168 nations had signed on, and in late
December 1993, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force.
Almost 150 of the signatory nations have
since ratified the CBD and are thereby subject to it as "parties." The United States, a
late and reluctant signatory, has never ratified
the CBD, but has been allowed to participate
as an observer at the subsequent conferences
of the parties and working group meetings.
In 1996, the CBD secretariat was installed in
Montreal, Canada, with Calestous Juma of
Kenya as its executive secretary.
Initially conceived as a framework for
preventing "loss of species and equitable
sharing of genetic resources," the enacted
706

CBD now stands for more-namely, for
ensuring sustainable development, for ensuring that all parties have biosafety procedures,
and for building the capabilities of developing nations in biotechnology, biodiversity
protection, and associated matters such as
biosafety. The CBD is generally regarded as
one of the most significant developments in
international law for environmental protection and national development.
The CBD is laden with principles, suggestions, and legally ambiguous but potentially obligatory mandates for the party
nations. However, to the extent that it obligates party nations, it will also affect their
relationships with nonparty nations such as
the United States, and thereby have indirect
effect on nonparties.
Many provisions call for, in a mixture of
obligatory and aspirational terms, actions by
parties that will build the biotechnical and
biodiversity capabilities of developing
nations, such as providing research, training, and financial assistance; engaging in
technology transfer; using impact assessment and information sharing; and making
equitable arrangements for sharing the fruits
of research and commerce involving biodiversity. Several matters that were hotly disputed in drafting the CBD are left unresolved in the final text, which designates
them for future resolution. These include
intellectual property rights, liability and
sanctions, and biosafety.
Two provisions directly address biosafety. Article 19(3) provides that: "The parties
shall consider the need for and modalities of
a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance
informed agreement, in the field of the safe
transfer, handling, and use of any living
modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity."
Article 8(g) calls upon each contracting
party, "as far as possible and as appropriate
[to] ... establish or maintain means to regulate, manage, or control the risks associated
with the use and release of living modified
organisms resulting from biotechnology,
which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity,
taking into account the risks to human
health."
These provisions are amplified by
Article 19(4), which requires that each party
share any available information about its use
of and safety regulations for handling
LMOs (including potential risks) with any
other party.
But other provisions, such as development of a future protocol on biosafety, are

substantively related to Article 19(3), and
can influence its implementation. For example, Article 16 calls for a cooperative
approach to patent rights and technology
transfer among the parties. It also calls on
the parties to have their private sectors (such
as biotechnology companies) similarly cooperate on intellectual property matters and
engage in technology transfer. Article 16
further defines the technologies to be transferred as those "that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity or make use of genetic resources"
without causing "significant harm to the
environment." Significantly, it also expansively provides that technology includes
biotechnology.
Thus, if parties comply with Article 16,
developing nations would be able to develop
their own capabilities for both biotechnology and biosafety, gaining far more than
what would be gained from a prescriptive
protocol developed under Article 19.
Nevertheless, development of an Article 19
protocol on biosafety now preoccupies the
CBD parties, probably because of immediate concerns about environmental risks, the
desire to slow down the onslaught of LMOs
made in the United States, and the need for
time to develop economic and political
strategies.

Biosafety Protocol
Parties to the CBD meet annually at a
Conference of the Parties (COP), with the
United States and numerous nongovernmental organizations permitted to attend as
observers. Discussion of a biosafety protocol
dominated the first two COPs in 1994 and
1995, and led to the creation of an openended ad hoc working group in November
1995 with the mandate to develop a protocol on biosafety. The working group will
meet in Arhus, Denmark, in July to take
first steps such as defining terms, selecting
issues to be addressed, setting the boundaries of the protocol, and reviewing existing

biosafety policies.
According to Juma, dates for completion of the protocol have not been fixed,
although it is hoped that a draft will be
available so that negotiation of a final text
can begin in 1998. A consensus decision on
the protocol will then be sought at the next
COP, with disputed provisions to be negotiated to resolution, following traditional
U.N. practice. Thus, a final biosafety protocol could be enacted by 1999.
The working group's mandate is provided by Decision Document 1/5, approved at
the COP-2 meeting held in Jakarta,
Indonesia, in November 1995. The mandate sets forth reasons for a protocol including: gaps in knowledge regarding the "inter-
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action between LMOs resulting from modern biotechnology and the environment,
taking into account the relatively short period of experience with the releases of such
organisms, the relatively small number of
species and traits used, and the lack of experience in the range of environment . . ."
that existing international agreements do
not specifically address the issue of transboundary movements of LMOs; that international action "should offer an effective
and efficient framework for . . . insuring
biosafety through effective risk assessment
and risk management . . .;" and a large
majority of the parties favor the development of a protocol on biosafety.
The mandate directs the working group
to evaluate existing LMO biosafety policies
in developing the protocol, such as guidelines enacted by the United Nations' Food
and Agriculture Organization, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and most
importantly, the International Technical
Guidelines on Safety in Biotechnology now
being finalized by UNEP.
The UNEP guidelines, based on work
done by a U.K.-Dutch team, represent a
more flexible, nonbinding approach, which
is preferred by the United States and several
parties to the CBD. Instead of being fitted
with a rigid protocol, each nation would
have the opportunity to consider guidelines
and ultimately craft its own approach to

biosafety.
The mandate provides that finalization
of the UNEP guidelines "does not prejudice
the development and conclusion of such . . .
protocol," and suggests that the guidelines
may serve as an interim mechanism during
protocol development, as well as a complementary system after completion and adoption of the protocol in order "to facilitate
development of national capacities to assess
and manage risks, establish adequate information systems, and develop expert human
resources." Thus, the working group is
directed to consider a parallel biosafety
development within the United Nations,
one that can accomplish "capacity building"
as envisioned by Artide 16 of the CBD.
The mandate condudes with the COP-2
decision that the working group is "to seek
solution to the abovementioned concerns
through a negotiation process to develop...
a protocol on biosafety, specifically focusing
on transboundary movement of any living
modified organism resulting from modern
biotechnology that may have an adverse
effect on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, setting out for
consideration, in particular, appropriate procedure for advance informed agreement."
The annex to the decision document

contains terms of reference to give more
detailed guidance to the working group.
According to the annex, priority is to be
given to the form and scope of advance
informed agreement, the relevant categories
of LMOs, the "precautionary principle"
contained in UNEP's Rio meeting declaration, completion of the group's work by
1998, and ratification of the protocol by the
largest number of parties. The working
group is further directed to ensure that the
protocol will minimize unnecessary negative
impacts on biotechnology research, development, and transfer.
At the July meeting in Arhus, the working group will begin to grapple with protocol development under this complex mandate. A task force of agencies has been
formed at the State Department to represent U.S. interests, although the U.S. role
will be limited by its observer status.
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the Netherlands, nascent biotechnological
powers who are parties to the CBD, also
favor the more flexible, nonbinding guidelines approach advocated by the United
States.
According to Simon Best, CEO of
Zeneca, a biotechnology firm, and chairman
of BIO's Committee on Agricultural
Biotechnology, "The widely held view of
developed nations and many developing
countries is to follow a guidelines approach
to assure that the most appropriate system
can be used in each developing nation,
including advance informed agreement and
capacity-building procedures, rather than
the more inflexible binding protocol
approach. Guidelines would allow for the
customized adoption of best practices for
each nation, and compatibility with its
existing laws and infrastructure. Most countries believe this approach would assure a
more fully protective approach to be taken
in each nation. The protocol effort also has
[the] unfortunate potential for diverting
COP attention and resources from major
needs like sustainable development and preventing deforestation."
Lisa Zannoni of the OECD points out
that "many nations use guidelines as the
United States uses regulations," and that
"the UNEP, FAO, OECD, and other
guidelines do not leave many gaps. UNEP is
now developing guideline implementation
procedures [that] will fill remaining gaps,
such as how to define and implement
advance informed agreement for commercial transboundary shipments." The OECD
has started developing a series of expert consensus documents, state-of-the-art reviews
on the environmental biosafety of transgenic plants. Like UNEP and the CBD secretariat, the OECD is providing biosafety
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information through the Internet for
informing the general public in all nations.
Despite these views and guideline
enhancement efforts, strong pressure for a
legally binding protocol with stringent features, a virtual biosafety regulation template
for each nation, is anticipated from the G77 group of nations, along with China,
Sweden, and Denmark, with support from
environmental organization observers.
As a result, the working group must
grapple with many technical, legal, and policy issues in a volatile political context, such
as whether the protocol should be legally
binding and require national adoption, or
be advisory; if binding, whether it should
provide for enforcement, sanctions, and liability; and whether binding or advisory, to
what extent it should adopt, or defer to, the
biosafety features of UNEP and other
guidelines, and the biosafety experience
gained in other developed nations.
On the issue of consent, the group must
also consider whether the advance informed
agreement process should be a simple notification procedure like the prior informed
consent procedure used for pesticide exports
under various laws and treaties, or more
expansive and require, for example, that
LMOs intended for shipment meet special
testing requirements, be evaluated by a particular method of risk assessment, or be
used subject to a particular method of risk
management; whether advance informed
agreement should be carried out by public
officials in each nation or by the private parties arranging for transboundary shipment
and, if the latter, how the proprietary information should be safeguarded; and whether
the public should be provided with information about the shipment.
In addition, the issue remains whether
the protocol should contain features that
minimize conflicts with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and World Trade Organization, or leave
such conflicts to subsequent case-by-case
resolution.
The stage is thus set for reaching accord
on a biosafety protocol for LMOs.
Depending on its features, such a protocol
could play a major role in shaping the
future use of biotechnology in agriculture,
sustainable development in developing
nations, and the growth of the biotechnology industry around the world.

Michael Baram
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